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Abstract
Past research on initial  public  offerings  suggests  that  the  reputation  of  a  company  positively
affects the success of the offering. Success is usually measured in financial terms as if the  essence
of  the  operation  lied  only  in  the  short-term  inflow  of  money.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate
important albeit often neglected implications of going public by combining evidence from a series
of preliminary case studies taken from the results of a survey of 57 Italian initial  public  offerings.
Evidence from our research suggests that, besides providing an important inflow of capital,  going
public may actually improve the reputational and social capital  of  a  company,  by  increasing  its
visibility, prestige and perceived trustworthiness. Therefore,  going  public  may  be  an  important
way  to  support  entrepreneurial  activity,  as  it   may   expand   and   reinforce   the   network   of
relationships  that  offer  access  to  external  resources,   complementary   skills   and   investment
opportunities.
Introduction
Going public is an important step in the acquisition of resources needed  to  sustain  an  entrepreneurial  venture.  Past
research on initial public offerings (IPOs), however, has largely focused on the financial aspects of the  process:  more
or less implicitly, raising investment capital has been considered the fundamental reason to go public, and accordingly
the success of an IPO has usually been measured  in  financial  terms  by  the  amount  of  capital  raised  (e.g.  Deeds,
Decarolis and Coombs, 1997), the market capitalization after the issue (e.g. Stuart, Hoang and Hybels), the long  term
performance (e.g. Welbourne and Cyr, 1999) or the underpricing of the stocks (e.g. Beatty and Ritter,  1986).  Raising
investment capital is undoubtedly important, and we are not  denying  the  intrinsically  financial  nature  of  an  initial
public offering. We believe, however, that the focus on  the  financial  side  of  the  phenomenon  has  led  scholars  to
underestimate  other  potential  benefits  of  going  public   and   to   therefore   neglect   other   potentially   important
implications. Entrepreneurial activity,  in  fact,  requires  far  more  than  just  money.  An  established  perspective  in
entrepreneurial studies observes how success requires the acquisition of a  variety  of  resources  that  include  money,
equipment, information, political influence, support and advice, through a network of partners (Birley,  1982;  Aldrich
and Zimmer, 1986; Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Larson 1991; Steier and Greenwood, 2000).
In this paper we combine evidence from a series of preliminary case studies with  the  results  of  a
survey of 57 Italian IPOs, and investigate a wider range of  potentially  important  implications  of
going public, many of which are usually neglected or presented as side benefits and  glossed  over.
Evidence from our research indicates that going public can be a way  to  improve  the  reputational
and social capital of a company, with beneficial effects on its capacity to access external resources
and opportunities to sustain entrepreneurial  activity.  Our  study  reveals  that,  in  addition  to  the
usual financial motives, the decision to  go  public  is  increasingly  stimulated  by  a  search  for  a
higher  visibility  and  prestige  and  that  it  is  seen  as  an  important  step  in  the  expansion  and
reinforcement of the network of relationships that sustains entrepreneurial activity.
In the following  sections,  we  present  a  brief  review  of  past  literature  on  IPOs,  describe  the
research methodology, and discuss findings from our study. In the final section, we provide  some
concluding remarks and discuss the implications of our findings for future research and practice.
A review of past studies
The existing literature on IPOs has historically focused on the financial side  of  the  phenomenon,
implicitly assuming that going public is fundamentally a matter of  raising  capital  and  increasing
the liquidity of stocks (Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1988). Indeed, going public  allows  firms  to
access external financial resources that can be used to  seize  and  finance  growth  opportunity,  to
compensate for a lack of capital (Harvey and  Evans,  1995),  or  to  rebalance  a  high  debt/equity
level (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998). Likewise, in the long run  access to  the  stock  market
increases the company’s borrowing power and enhances its bargaining power for the reduction  of
borrowing costs (Krips Newman,  1985).  Moreover,  since  stocks  are  more  easily  transferable,
banks are more willing to accept the stocks as a guarantee. Finally, from the shareholders’ point of
view, going public facilitates  personal  liquidity  leading  to  portfolio  diversification  as  well  as
provides management and other internal shareholders  with  important  outside  information  about
the firm’s value. This aspect has been extensively studied in the family business literature (e.g. De
Visscher, Aronoff and Ward, 1995),  because  a  precise  assessment  of  a  firm’s  value  becomes
critical when a family member wants to execute a share transaction.
The majority of literature, however, converges on the fundamental  idea  that  the  most  important
reason to go public is to infuse a significant amount of investment capital into  the  firm  (Ibbotson
and Ritter, 1995). As a result, studies in the financial tradition focused on the  initial  underpricing
of new stocks on the market as an appropriate measure of the success of  the  operation  (Ibbotson,
1975; Ritter, 1984; Leleux and Muzyka, 1995). If stocks  are  underpriced,  in  fact,  entrepreneurs
“leave money on  the  table”  –  and  therefore  bear  an  opportunity  cost  in  term  of  lost  equity
financing. Even if the  typical  behavior  of  IPOs  is  a  price  “run  up”,  some  issues  show  price
declination once the trading starts (Keasey, McGuinness and Short, 1992), resulting in an intrinsic
element of  uncertainty  for  entrepreneurs  and  investors.  For  these  reasons,  the  issue  of  IPOs
underpricing has been widely investigated in  the  past.  Several  theoretical  and  empirical  works
have proposed alternative explanations to the phenomenon (see Tiniç, 1988 for a review). Two  of
the more credited explanations to date hypothesize an information asymmetry between issuers and
investment bankers on the state of the capital markets (Baron, 1982), or between  different  groups
of potential investors: informed investors, who know when and where to  invest,  and  uninformed
buyers who subscribe to every IPO without discriminating (Rock, 1986).
As reducing the asymmetry of information and the inherent uncertainty  is  required  to  maximize
the capital inflow, it is important that, in bringing the firm to the equity market for  the  first  time,
the entrepreneur conveys information to potential investors as to the value of the firm. That is why
much theoretical and empirical work has explored how  entrepreneurs  might  signal  the  value  of
their firm to potential investors (e.g. Leland  and  Pyle,  1977,  Titman  and  Trueman,  1986).  For
example, past studies suggest that in the presence  of  information  asymmetry  entrepreneurs  may
signal the true value of the firm via their own observable actions. Empirical  evidence  has  shown
that these signals are mainly related to the equity entrepreneurs retain  and  the  amount  of  capital
expenditure they plan to undertake  (e.g.  Keasey,  McGuinness  and  Short,  1992).  Other  studies
indicate that entrepreneurs can  rely  on  the  reputation  of  underwriters  as  an  indirect  signal  to
potential  subscribers  of  the  value  of  the  firm.  A  prestigious  underwriter,  in  fact,  seems   to
positively affect the success of the offering, as the quality of the underwriter  certifies  the  quality
of the issue (Carter and Manastar 1990).
More recently, a substantial contribution to understanding the conditions for a successful IPO  has
come from researchers in the entrepreneurship and management  fields,  who  have  expanded  the
scope of inquiry to organizational, institutional and strategic issues.  One  study  of  biotechnology
firms (Deeds, Decarolis and  Coomb,  1997)  offered  further  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  the
success of an IPO depends on the credibility of the  signals  sent  by  the  entrepreneurial  firm.  In
particular,  results  suggest  that  the  financial  market  uses  information  such  as  the  number  of
citations of the firm’s scientists or the geographical location  of  a  company  to  make  an  indirect
assessment of a firm’s capabilities. These intangible assets, in turn, seem to  affect  the  evaluation
of the company in a substantial way. Another study of the biotechnology industry  (Stuart,  Hoang
and  Hybels,  1999)  extended  past  findings  on   the   importance   of   underwriters’   reputation,
indicating that the credibility of a company is affected by a  broader  range  of  interorganizational
relationships that include equity holders, investment bankers, research partners and  other  alliance
partners.  Finally,  Welbourne  and  Cyr  (1999)  observed  that  having  a  senior  human-resource
manager reporting directly to the CEO  positively  affected  the  short-term  increase  of  the  stock
price of high-growth, small sized firms. Conversely, the opposite was observed for  midsize,  low-
growth firms. According to the researchers, these  results  validate  the  strategic  role  that  human
resource management plays in the small, entrepreneurial venture, while at  the  same  time  raising
questions on the adequacy of the human resource staff of medium-sized firms  to  face  challenges
that do not affect small firms (lawsuits, increasing rigidity, bureaucratization, etc.).
In summary,  most  studies  on  the  performance  of  initial  public  offerings  seem  to  share  two
common features: the adoption of a short-term perspective and a focus on the financial side of  the
phenomenon.  Even   when   these   studies   investigated   how   variables   of   organizational   or
institutional nature affect the success of an  IPO,  they  invariably  adopted  financial  measures  of
success such as the post-IPO market capitalization (Stuart, Hoang and Hyble,  1999),  the  amount
of capital raised (Deeds, Decarolis and Coomb, 1997) or the short-term increase of the stock  price
(Welbourne and Cyr, 1999). Although these financial measures provide a  reliable  way  to  assess
the performance of some dimensions of an IPO, however, they  tend  to  reinforce  the  assumption
that IPOs are essentially a financial matter. The fundamental goals  that  a  firm  pursues  in  going
public, then, come to be taken for granted and  is  therefore  synthesized  in  the  notion  of  simply
raising additional capital to finance  growth.  Conversely,  our  research  attempts  to  remove  this
preconceived notion and  questions  this  general  assumption,  thereby  approaching  the  goals  of
going  public  objectively,  rather  than  an  unquestioned   starting   point.   A   closer   and   more
comprehensive look at the decision process leading to  an  IPO  revealed  that  the  decision  to  go
public may be in fact be influenced by a more complex set of motives and may be supported  by  a
much broader range of benefits.
Research method
Our research followed a two-step approach that combined  the  richness  and  depth  of  qualitative  methods  for  data
collection and  analysis  and  the  methodological  rigor  of  quantitative  research  tools  (Creswell,  1994).  An  initial
qualitative phase based on  seven  case  studies  provided  rich  and  insightful  data  that  allowed  us  to  derive  some
empirically grounded propositions about the benefits that come from going public. A second quantitative phase, based
on a survey of 57 IPOs, was used to test  the  external  validity  and  the  robustness  of  our  claims  across  the  whole
population.
The research setting
In recent  years,  Italian  entrepreneurs  have  started  to  change  their  attitude  towards  the  stock
markets. The gradual increase in the number of private  firms  that  every  year  turn  to  the  Stock
Exchange was initiated in 1995 by a law that introduced substantial tax breaks for  new  listings  –
the  so  called  Tremonti  Law.  It  was  sustained  later  by  a  large   wave   of   privatization   that
considerably expanded the size and the efficiency of the market. While  in  the  past  non-financial
listed companies were mainly state-owned firms or large family groups, new sections of the Stock
Exchange especially dedicated to small, fast growing companies  – like the Nuovo Mercato – have
facilitated the access of a high number of young entrepreneurial ventures. The positive  experience
of some ‘pioneers’ has helped to overcome the widespread  mistrust  of  entrepreneurs  and  small-
business owners  and  triggered  an  imitation  effect  that  has  brought  an  increasing  number  of
companies to open their capital to the financial markets (see table I).
----------------------
Table I here
----------------------
The comparative case study
The first step of the research was based  on  seven  case  studies  of  companies  who  went  public
between 1995 and 1998 (see table II, company  names  have  been  disguised  for  confidentiality).
We initially restricted the selection to those companies listed between two  and  four  years  before
the study, so that our informants would have had time to fully appreciate the consequences  of  the
event, while  at  the  same  time  their  recollection  of  the  process  would  still  be  vivid  in  their
memory. Within this population, we selected companies that represented a variety  of  sizes,  ages,
industries and ownership  structures  (fragmented  vs.  concentrated,  open  to  merchant  banks  or
industrial  partners  vs.  closed,  etc.).  We  followed  Andrew  Pettigrew’s  principle  of   “planned
opportunism”, choosing firms that represented extreme  situations,  combining  highly-visible  and
much debated cases with less  scrutinized,  more  “ordinary”  cases  (Pettigrew,  1990).  Following
Pettigrew’s recommendations, we purposefully selected firms that, to our  knowledge,  seemed  to
disprove   patterns   from   previous   studies.   In   this   theory-building   phase,   we    considered
heterogeneity as a path to the widest possible variation in data, in order to grasp the complexity of
the phenomenon better and, as a consequence, to develop  a  richer  and  more  refined  conceptual
framework. The selection was somewhat sequential as some cases were included in the study after
the collection  and  analysis  of  data  had  already  started.  Following  common  prescriptions  for
multiple case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989), we replicated the study  until  we  had  evidence  that  we
had reached what Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as “theoretical saturation”. In other words  we
stopped when the incremental learning coming from each  additional  case  had  become  minimal,
because what we observed did not seem to improve our emerging framework further.
----------------------------
Table II here
-----------------------------
Data collection combined multiple sources of data that included both archival  research  and  other
secondary sources complemented by in-depth interviews with people who had participated  in  the
listing process (see table II). The interviews were aimed at obtaining a broad representation of  the
phenomenon by investigating the driving forces leading to the decision to go  public,  the  benefits
that the company achieved, and the changes that going public brought about in  the  organizational
structure, culture, systems and processes. All  the  interviews  followed  a  common  protocol.  We
adopted an open-ended format in  order  to  collect  both  factual  data  and  personal  impressions.
During the interviews, we encouraged our informants to specifically refer to facts and  events  that
left  a  trace  in  their  memory.  All  the  interviews  were  taped  and  transcribed.  If   information
collected at a later stage required further probing or the clarification of minor discrepancies,  some
informants were interviewed more than once. Our tentative reconstruction of each  case  was  later
submitted to our  main  contact  persons,  either  personally  or  by  telephone,  in  order  to  ensure
reliability and to integrate and refine the emerging framework.
Data analysis was  based  on  common  techniques  for  grounded  theory  building  and  combined
within-case analysis to cross-case comparison (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;  Eisenhardt,  1989;  Lee,
1999). Within-case analysis was initially conducted to identify a number  of  core  constructs.  The
identification of core constructs was based on a content analysis of the  interviews.  Therefore,  we
searched interviews for passages that contained references to causes and  expected  or  unexpected
consequences of  the  decision  to  go  public.  The  search  was  conducted  independently  by  the
researchers;  later  comparison  of  independent  analysis  showed  a  substantial  agreement.   This
coding  procedure  helped  us  to  identify,  for  each  case,  a  number  of  key  themes.  Following
indications from Eisenhardt (1989), we referred to the existing literature to develop and  to  enrich
these inductively derived  insights.  In  this  phase,  we  often  relied  on  data  collected  from  our
archival research to go beyond our informant’s accounts, and to  extend  and  refine  the  emerging
framework. Provisional interpretations and tentative propositions were refined in several iterations
between theory and data until we were able, for each case, to  provide  a  plausible  explanation  of
the observed patterns.
In a second stage, in order to refine emerging constructs and verify how strongly each  contributed
to  explain  the  observed  phenomenon,  we   conducted   a   cross-case   comparison.   Cross-case
comparison helped us to verify the robustness of our  provisional  interpretations  across  cases.  In
some cases, the comparison required a further homogenization of concepts, as some  themes  were
grouped into a more general concept. In  other  cases,  propositions  were  refined,  to  include  the
effect of intervening variables. Again, the process followed an iterative  path,  until  the  emerging
conceptual framework fit the observed patterns across cases. At the end of this operation we  were
able to identify a number of core issues related to the decision to go public. As it often happens  in
inductive research, these findings in part confirm and in part extend past literature,  and  they  will
be discussed in the next section.
The survey study
In a second phase, we looked for support for the external validity of our claims, checking  to  what
extent the core constructs emerging from the cases were not peculiar  to  the  few  observed  cases,
but contributed to the explanation of the  phenomenon  over  the  general  population.  In  order  to
verify whether the  emerging  explanatory  framework  could  be  extended  beyond  the  observed
cases, we turned to a questionnaire to  collect  quantitative  data  across  a  larger  population.  The
questionnaire contained a broad range of items developed on the basis of evidence  from  the  case
studies. In this paper, however, we will discuss only results  from  the  first  section,  investigating
the extent to which issues like prestige, visibility and network building affected the decision to  go
public (see Appendix 1). Translating the observed reasons that affected the decision  to  go  public
into items of a questionnaire gave us the possibility to collect quantitative data that could be factor
analyzed looking for underlying patterns and latent  constructs.  The  fact  that  the  results  of  this
factor analysis were essentially in line with what we observed in the  qualitative  study  reinforced
the internal validity of our claim.
The questionnaire was distributed to a sample  of  companies  that  went  public  in  Italy  between
January 1995 and December 2000. In this period, 131 companies were listed on  the  Italian  Stock
Exchange. The actual population that we studied,  however,  was  smaller,  as  we  excluded  some
companies  that  operate  in  real  estate,  finance,  banking  or   insurance   services,   because   the
specificity of their activity, normative  framework  and  typical  ownership  structure  makes  them
hardly comparable with the rest of the population. For similar  reasons  we  excluded  state-owned
companies, for which going public was essentially a step in the privatization process.  Finally,  we
excluded  from  the  sample  companies  that  were  already  listed  in  other  stock  exchanges,   or
companies that were listed after having acquired companies whose  stocks  were  already  publicly
traded. In the end, privately owned  companies,  in  the  form  of  family  firms  or  entrepreneurial
ventures composed  the  vast  majority  of  our  sample.  The  final  sample  was  composed  of  91
companies, each receiving a questionnaire. Whenever possible, questionnaires were  addressed  to
the managing director; alternatively they were re-directed to the financial director or the  investor-
relations manager. We required, however, that the  respondent  had  participated  in  the  decision-
making process that led to the IPO. After three months and follow-up telephone calls to encourage
a reply, we received 57 answers, for a redemption rate of 62,6%. Curiously enough, only  two  out
of the seven  companies  that  were  analyzed  in  depth  responded  to  our  questionnaire,  slightly
increasing the scope of our study. 
Data analysis, as anticipated, was aimed at checking the  robustness  of  the  framework  emerging
from the qualitative study across a broader sample of  companies.  We  ran  an  exploratory  factor
analysis in order to check for latent constructs.  The results supported the argument that  issues  of
visibility,  prestige  and  network  building  form  an  interrelated  set  of  reasons  that  affects  the
decision to go public in a substantial way. Results of the quantitative analysis will be discussed  in
more detail in the fifth section.
Building social capital to sustain entrepreneurial action
The  preliminary  case  studies  offered  us  a  representation  of  the  phenomenon  that  conformed  only  partially   to
expectations  based  on  past  literature.  As  could  be  expected,  financial  issues  were  mentioned  by  most  of   our
informants. However, as hypothesized the interviews revealed a broader range of motives and benefits, where  raising
capital, although important, was just one among many (see table III). Although, all the companies  formally  stated  in
their offering circulars that the fundamental goal of the offering was to raise funds  to  finance  development  projects,
only a few were more specific about what. Indeed, some of our informants explicitly stated that financial capital could
have been found elsewhere, and that going public was meant to stimulate an upgrade in the profile of the  firm,  and  a
redefinition of internal and external relationships. These changes were often  considered  as  important  as  the  capital
infusion to reinforce the capacity of the company to sustain long-term growth.
----------------------
Table III here
----------------------
Furthermore, a reconstruction of the connections between going  public  and  the  related  benefits,
both expected and unexpected, suggested that what was reported by our  informants  was  actually
the manifestation of a deeper set of changes  that  affected  the  way  the  general  perception  of  a
company changed after being listed. From the financial point of view,  for  instance,  some  of  our
informants observed that rather than the capital raised in the operation, what  really  mattered  was
that going public (i) decreased the average  cost  of  capital,  because  the  companies  managed  to
obtain a reduction on their bank interests after having gone public, and  (ii)  opened  up  a  broader
range of opportunities  for  raising  additional  capital.  The  first  phenomenon  had  already  been
measured by Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) and can be ascribed to  a  reduction  in  the  risk
that banks associate to the company.  A  listed  company,  in  fact,  is  subject  to  a  tighter  set  of
controls both from the regulators and from institutional investors. Listed companies are  forced  to
a greater transparency, comprehensiveness and timeliness of their financial reports. The  increased
flow of information, then, allows a  better  assessment  of  the  company’s  plans  and  reduces  the
uncertainty surroundings the company’s future, therefore reducing the discount rate applied to  the
expected future returns. The  second  phenomenon  is  not  only  related  to  the  higher  variety  of
financial tools that, within the Italian regulatory framework, a  company  can  use  to  raise  capital
(i.e. bonds, preferred stocks, etc.), but also to a higher number of spontaneous contacts from banks
and other financial companies, offering financial products. This seems to  be  explained  partly  by
the increased trustworthiness that we have already  discussed,  and  partly  by  the  fact  that  going
public improves  the  visibility  of  the  company,  also  thanks  to  the  advertising  campaign  that
supports  the  operation  and  to  the  increased  attention   of   the   press,   and   brings   it   almost
automatically under the attention of potential financial partners.  In  summary,  from  the  financial
point  of  view,  evidence  from  the  cases  suggest  that,  apart  from  bringing  the   company   an
predetermined amount of capital, going public changes the standing of the company, increasing its
perceived trustworthiness and visibility in the financial community.
Issues of visibility also seem to influence the reasons that bring second- or third-generation family-
owned companies to separate the destiny and  the  economy  of  the  company  from  those  of  the
family. Past literature has observed how in a  publicly-traded  company  the  liquidity  of  the  title
would make  it  easier  for  family  members  to  exit  the  capital  without  tensions,  and  how  the
discipline  of  the  market  would  make  sure  that  managerial  positions  are  assigned  based   on
competence rather than dynasty (De Visscher, Aronoff and Ward, 1995). Some of our  informants,
however, suggested that the  status  of  listed  company  itself  made  a  managing  position  in  the
company  more  attractive,  as  it  offered  professional  managers  a  higher  visibility  within   the
industrial  and  financial  community  thanks  to  the  higher  press  coverage   and   the   increased
occasions for contacts with  other  companies  and  institutions.  Also,  as  one  of  our  informants
observed, in Italy – where until a few years ago very few, mostly  large  companies  were  listed  –
the perception of the quality of a company tends to improve as it goes  public,  as  if  going  public
were a sign of excellence. It seems that the status and prestige of the managers of a newly publicly
traded company tend to increase as well. It is not clear, however, if this effect would last  as  more
and more companies – some of arguable quality – join the stock exchange.
The beneficial effects of increased visibility, standing and perceived trustworthiness seemed to  go
well beyond financial or managerial matters. In  some  cases,  going  public  marked  a  substantial
discontinuity in the competitive positioning of the companies. For example, in the case of Empire,
a large Italian private television broadcaster, going public was essential  for  the  establishment  of
alliances  with  other  competitors  in  the  international   arena   in   order   to   capitalize   on   the
opportunities within the digital and satellite broadcasting industry..  Only  by  going  public  could
the company could support the establishment of these  alliances  with  an  exchange  of  shares,  as
industrial partners were reluctant to enter with private capital. Besides giving the new partners  the
possibility to sell their shares on the market in case the  alliance  had  not  been  successful,  going
public made Empire a more reliable and trustworthy strategic partner. Going  public,  as  we  have
already observed, subjected the firm  to  a  closer  scrutiny  by  regulatory  agencies  and  financial
analysts,  and  forced  the  company  to  introduce  more  transparent   accounting   principles   and
governance structures (indeed, the new partners also asked and obtained  important  modifications
to the company by-laws).
Similarly, Firegas, a little known producer of components for home appliances discovered that the
relationships with its  large  customers  changed  substantially  after  the  listing,  as  the  company
started to be considered, using the words of the managing director, as a “trustworthy  counterpart”
and  to  be  treated  as  an  equal  partner.  Our  informants  associated  a   number   of   subsequent
commercial  initiatives,  among  which  a  supply  agreement  on  a   global   scale   with   a   large
multinationals,  to  the  increased  standing  of  the  company.  Going  public  also   increased   the
company’s visibility, so that a number of companies operating in contiguous  industries  contacted
the management in the following months, proposing so many joint  development  initiatives,  that,
as the managing director told us, they had  problems  in  “keeping  track  of  all  of  them”.  At  the
moment  of  our  study,  most  of  these  projects  were  still  in  an   embryonic   stage,   but   were
nevertheless regarded as  important  opportunities  for  diversification.  Evidence  from  the  cases,
then, seems to indicate that going public may increase  the  capacity  of  a  company  to  build  and
reinforce a network of relationships through which it can access a variety  of  resources:  not  only
finance, but also managerial skills, complementary technologies and investment opportunities.
Entrepreneurship is about discovering and exploiting opportunities for new valuable combinations
of resources (Schumpeter, 1934). The possibility to access and make use of resources that  are  not
currently controlled is a critical component of the entrepreneurial process (Jarillo  and  Stevenson,
1990). In this respect, entrepreneurship studies seem to challenge one of the fundamental tenets of
a resource-based perspective, that posits that competitive  advantage  rests  on  the  endowment  of
resources of a firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1995).  Indeed,  entrepreneurial  success  seems  to
rest more on the capacity of the entrepreneur to recognize unexploited opportunity  for  a  valuable
recombination of scarce resources and to overcome the  limits  posed  by  the  available  resources
(Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985). This is the reason why, early studies  adopting  a  resource-based
approach  concluded  that  this  perspective  had   “little   to   say”   about   small,   entrepreneurial
companies (Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery,  1995;  Wernerfelt,  1995).  As  recent  work  shifted
attention  from  the  endowment  of  resources  to  the  cognitive   capacity   to   identify   valuable
destination  for  existing  resources  and  to  continuously  recombine  them   in   innovative   ways
(Galunic  and  Rodan,  1998),  however,  a  tighter  connection  with  the  Schumpeterian  view  of
entrepreneurial innovation was drawn, focusing on resource use, rather than  resource  availability
(Salvato, 1999).
Because  entrepreneurs  rarely  control  all  the  resources  they  need   and   use   (money,   market
information,  professional  skills,  managerial  talent,  technological  capabilities,  etc.),  successful
entrepreneurial firms often leverage internal resources, knowledge and capabilities, by  connecting
them with resources and capabilities possessed by external partners (Larson, 1991, Lorenzoni  and
Lipparini, 1999). Furthermore, as Ronald Burt observed, the very capacity to identify  and  exploit
opportunities of innovation in a timely and effective way depends on what Burt  called  the  social
capital of the firm – i.e. the sum of all the relationships that a firm possesses and all the  resources
that can be mobilized through that network (Burt, 1993 and 1997; Nahapiet  and  Ghoshal,  1998).
As the complexity of the task environment increases and the distribution of the resources  and  the
competencies   required    for    carrying    out    entrepreneurial    initiatives    expands,    in    fact,
competitiveness requires the  creation  and  consolidation  of  a  network  of  relationships  for  the
exchange of knowledge and information, and the collaboration in entrepreneurial  initiatives.  Past
literature  on  the  importance   of   social   capital   for   successful   entrepreneurial   activity   has
emphasized the first function, viewing the social  network  mainly  as  a  way  to  gain  timely  and
privileged access to scarce resources or valuable information  (Aldrich  and  Zimmer,  1986;  Burt,
1992). More recent contributions have underlined the importance of social networks  for  the  joint
discovery and exploitation of opportunities of innovation, as being able to tap a broad  network  of
relationships  and  harness  complementary  skills   and   capabilities   along   innovative   projects
becomes critical (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1999). Extending one’s visibility  and  network
of relationships, therefore, is not to be seen just as a  way  to  obtain  valuable  information  before
competitors, but also as a way to extend the number of collaborations and alliances through which
entrepreneurial pursuit of competitive advantage is carried out.
Evidence from the cases seems to indicate that listed  firms  enjoy  an  enrichment  of  their  social
capital, thanks to an improvement in what we could refer to as their reputational capital –  i.e.  the
sum of all the intangible assets that rely on the external collective representation of  and  judgment
on the company (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Van Riel, 1998).  On  the  one  hand,  this  can  be
explained by  the  increased  visibility  of  the  company,  in  part  as  a  consequence  of  the  press
coverage, in part because going public introduces the company in a restricted industrial elite,  with
privileged relationships with  the  financial  community.  Ronald  Burt  (1993)  observes  how  the
supportive network of an entrepreneur if formed by “everyone you know, everyone you have  ever
known, and everyone who knows you even though you don’t know  them  [italics  added].”  In  this
respect, by increasing the visibility of a  company,  going  public  expands  a  firm’s  network  and
improves  its  chances  to  access  valuable  resources  (capital,  information,   collaboration,   etc.)
distributed in the environment. This effect seems to  be  more  important  for  small  companies  or
producers of industrial goods.
Going public, however, seems to have also a beneficial effect on the  reputation  of  companies  of
all kinds, and, therefore, on their relationships with a number of actors, like  financial  institutions,
large customers, professional managers and potential industrial partners. Evidence from  the  cases
suggests that the  mere  fact  of  going  public  positively  affect  the  collective  judgement  of  the
various stakeholders and counterparts, in  part  because  of  the  higher  prestige  that  being  listed
confers to the company, and in part, as we have observed earlier, because the tighter set  of  norms
that  a  public  company  is  subject  to,  positively  affects  the  perceived  trustworthiness  of   the
company. Past studies on trust indicate that the trustworthiness of actors increases  when  they  are
subject to formal mechanisms  that  certifies  the  accountability  or  the  competence  of  the  actor
(Zucker, 1986) or that impose a social cost on opportunistic behavior (Barney and Hansen,  1994).
By going public, a company enters a completely new institutional field (DiMaggio,  1988),  where
legitimation and access to critical resources require to meet the expectations of  financial  analysts
and institutional investors and to comply with the rules set by the regulating agencies – Consob, in
Italy – to safeguard the interests of  the  general  public.  This  wider  set  of  institutional  controls
promotes  transparency  and  accountability,  making   of   listed   companies   more   reliable   and
trustworthy partners for a broader set of counterparts.
In summary, many of the strategic, relational and financial benefits that our informants  associated
with the decision to go public seem to be based on a deeper improvement in what we  have  called
the reputational capital of a  company.  Increased  visibility  extends  the  number  of  persons  and
organizations that know of  the  company  and  may  consider  it  as  a  potential  business  partner.
Furthermore, going public seems to confer companies a higher standing  and  an  aura  of  prestige
that makes them attractive and desirable partners, insofar as  the  reputation  of  their  counterparts
(professional  managers,  financial   companies,   industrial   and   commercial   partners,   etc.)   is
positively affected by their association with a  prestigious  partner  (Podolny  and  Phillips,  1996).
Finally, the attractiveness of listed companies as counterparts is increased  by  the  more  stringent
set of institutional controls that they are subjected to. In more formal terms:
Proposition 1: All other things being equal, going public increases the perceived  trustworthiness,
the prestige and the visibility of a company.
Proposition 2: Improved perceived trustworthiness, prestige  and  visibility,  in  turn,  increase  the
number of contacts in the social network of a company and the attractiveness of the company as  a
partner.
Proposition 3. The enrichment of  the  social  network  and  the  increased  attractiveness,  in  turn,
positively affect the capacity of the company  to  access  financial  and  managerial  resources  and
investment opportunities.
As anticipated in the method section, in order to assess the external validity and the  robustness  of
this  emerging  framework,  we  developed  a  questionnaire  aimed  at  investigating  reasons  and
benefits of going public on a larger scale. In the next section we will discuss its  results  and  show
how they seem to offer substantial support to our line of argument.
Social capital, reputational capital and the decision to go public
In the previous section, building on evidence from seven case studies, we have argued that going public increases  the
perceived trustworthiness, the prestige and the visibility of a company.  We  have  observed  how  the  upgrade  of  its
reputational capital seems to lead to an enrichment of the social capital of the company and to  its  capacity  to  access
external resources. Although past literature has often mentioned the beneficial effects of going public on a company’s
visibility and reputation, the  issue  has  never  been  thoroughly  investigated  and  these  benefits  have  been  usually
presented as marginal. Our results, instead, show a different picture. A descriptive analysis of our  data  indicates  that
issues related to visibility, image, status and reputation might be just as important as financial matters  (see  table  IV).
Companies in our sample, in fact, ranked items related to relational and reputational issues as high as  financial  items.
While financing internal growth holds the first position with a mean score of 5.75, it is followed closely by the will  to
facilitate external growth, to improve a company’s image and to increasing its visibility, that rank number  two  (mean
score 5.59), three (5.46) and four (5.25). Supporting the establishment of strategic alliances ranks  number  six  (4.65),
little below the diversification of sources of capital (4.77).
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Furthermore, an exploratory  factor  analysis  on  twelve  items  expressing  reasons  to  go  public
revealed  the  substantial  correlation  between  items  related  to  issues  of  reputation  and  social
networking. Usual test of significance indicated that the results of the analysis  offered  us  a  good
representation of the observed reality. The Bartlett test of sphericity (Chi-square  =  219.575)  was
significant at a level of p<0.001 and the KMO  measure  of  sampling  adequacy  was  0.652,  well
above  the  recommended  cut-off  rate  of  0.50.  These  tests  reinforced  our  confidence   in   the
appropriateness of the sample. Using the criterion of the Eigenvalues,  we  extracted  four  factors,
collectively explaining 68.5% of the variance in the data. A varimax rotation was applied in  order
to facilitate the interpretation  of  the  components.  A  comparison  with  the  original  component
matrix showed that no distortion was introduced by the rotation. The rotated component matrix  is
reported in table V.
--------------------------
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Altogether these four factors seem to reflect four  complementary  aspects  of  the  decision  to  go
public. The third and the fourth factors correspond to the  dominant  perspectives  in  the  financial
and in the family-business literature on IPOs.  The  third  factor  (Cronbach’s  ?=0.70),  explaining
15.1% of the variance, collects  items  that  relate  the  issue  of  common  stocks  essentially  with
financial  matters.  The  fourth  factor  (Cronbach’s  ?=0.60),  explaining  12.2%  of  the  variance,
collects two items associated with the transformation that going public brings  about  in  privately-
owned companies,  facilitating  the  succession  passage  in  family  businesses  and  the  rise  of  a
professional management.  In this respect our findings confirm  that  the  need  to  raise  capital  to
finance growth or to rebalance debt/equity level, on the  one  hand,  and  the  need  to  support  the
succession process, on the other hand, are important components of the decision to go public.  Yet
they are not the only ones.
According to our findings, in fact, the decision to go public would be influenced also by two other
components. The second factor, explaining 15.1% of the variance, seems to reflect what we  could
call an “opportunistic” approach to the  decision,  whereby  an  important  driving  force  of  going
public would be the will to enjoy favorable external conditions – like the presence of tax breaks or
a favorable trend of the stock-exchange – regardless of what was officially declared in the offering
circular. A relatively low value of Cronbach’s alpha (?=0,55), however, raises questions about  the
reliability of using all the three items as a measure for this variable.
What  is  more  important  in  light  of  our  initial  evidence,  however,  is   that   the   first   factor
(Cronbach’s  ?=0,81),  which  explains  25.3%  of  the  variance,  collects  all  the  items  that   are
somehow related to the construction of a network of relationships and to an upgrade of the relative
position of the company. The first component, in fact, comprises  items  that  indicate  how  going
public is perceived both as a  way  to  improve  the  relative  position  of  the  company  within  its
network of relationships – increasing its visibility and  standing  –  and  as  a  way  to  support  the
expansion and reinforcement of this network. The high correlation between these  items  seems  to
indicate that they represent different but tightly coupled aspects of the same fundamental variable.
Also, the high proportion of the total variance accounted for by the first  factor  seems  to  indicate
the impact of the issue on patterns of decisions across the population. 
In aggregate, then, these results seem to support the argument that besides the immediate financial
benefits – i.e. the infusion of capital – going public opens up opportunities for future growth,  both
facilitating external growth, which can be paid  in  equity,  and  improving  the  visibility  and  the
reputation of the company in the business and financial community.
Conclusions and implications for theory and practice
In this article, we have tried to shift the attention from the widely studied effects  of  going  public
for the financial capital of a company, to the often underestimated benefits for its reputational  and
social capital. Building on evidence from a series of case studies, reinforced by  a  broader  survey
of 57 recently listed firms, we have argued that going public may be an important way  to  support
entrepreneurial activity, as it may expand and  reinforce  the  network  of  relationships  that  offer
access   to   external   resources,   complementary   skills   and   investment   opportunities.    More
specifically,  our  findings  suggest  that  the  combined  effect  of  higher  visibility,  prestige  and
perceived trustworthiness improve the capacity of the company  to  attract  valuable  resources,  to
lower their cost or to extract a higher value from them.  More  important,  the  enhanced  visibility
and trustworthiness increase the number of opportunities  for  collaboration  in  new  development
initiatives. Evidence from the cases, then, suggests that going public may be  aimed  at  expanding
and reinforcing the social network through which the company collects and deploys resources and
capabilities, thus sustaining its entrepreneurial activity (see figure 1).
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Furthermore, going public may increase the number of  strategic  opportunities  that  the  company
can select from, as it opens up a broader  range  of  possibilities  for  establishing  and  reinforcing
partnerships and alliances. Evidence from our study suggests, in fact, that an increasing number of
companies are turning to the stock markets, attracted by the possibility to  broaden  their  range  of
strategic options and to support entrepreneurial growth, along with the more traditional search  for
capital or management of succession.
We believe that the implications of our  findings  touch  both  theory  and  practice.  First,  from  a
theoretical point of view, building on our findings we  have  argued  that  going  public  positively
affects  the  reputation  of  a  company.  Past  studies  have  shown  that  the  prominence  and   the
reputation  of  organizations  that  are  associated  with  the  focal  company   –   merchant   banks,
industrial  partners,  etc.  –  have  a  positive  influence  on  the  success  of  the  offering,  as   they
contribute to legitimate the company in the  eye  of  the  investors  (e.g.  Beatty  and  Ritter,  1986;
Carter and  Manastar,  1990;  Stuart,  Hoang  and  Hybels,  1999).  Our  findings  suggest  that  the
relationship can also be the opposite: to some extent,  going  public  contributes  to  legitimating  a
company in the eye of its current and potential partners. We are aware that these findings could be
country- and time-specific. Future research, however, should be aimed at testing  the  propositions
that we have advanced in this article on the basis of our exploratory research.
In this respect, as observed by a reviewer, a serious methodological issue concerns the availability
of data to measure the reputational differential before and after the listing.  Traditional  sources  of
data, in fact, are not very helpful. Although  in  recent  years,  following  the  example  of  Fortune
magazine’s list of America’s most admired companies,  different  rankings  have  appeared  in  the
business press, most of them focus on already listed, and  often  gigantic  corporations.  An  easier
way to verify the  increase  in  a  company’s  reputation  may  be  to  test  separately  the  different
components that we have identified. A proxy  measure  of  visibility  may  be  obtained  through  a
content analysis of the business press before and after the listing, in order to  verify  the  extent  of
the actual increase in visibility that companies obtain from going public. Periodic ratings of  listed
companies are prepared and released by banks and rating companies. Often these ratings include a
measure  of  the  risk  associated  to  a  company,  which  could  be  used  as  a  proxy  measure  of
trustworthiness – although in this case it may be difficult to collect data about a company’s  rating
before going public. An alternative approach, which the  authors  are  currently  working  on,  may
rely on experimental research, an unusual method that allows, nevertheless, to set up a comparison
between alternative options, isolating the focal variable – i.e. the status of  listed  company  –  and
controlling other potential moderating variables.
From a methodological point of view, also, our findings suggest  that  past  studies  on  IPOs  may
have overlooked an important aspect of the phenomenon. By focusing on the  underpricing  or  the
total amount of capital raised, in fact,  past  studies  have  concentrated  only  on  one  aspect  of  a
decision  that,  as  our  findings  indicate,  seem  to  have  more  than   one   facet.   By   using   the
underpricing or the total amount raised as the only measure of success, in fact, past  studies  imply
that the success of an IPO is a purely short-term, financial matter. Our findings, however,  indicate
that besides the important financial motives, there may be other reasons that push companies to go
public. Concentrating on financial measures of success, therefore,  may  oversimplify  a  complex,
multi-dimensional decision process and may neglect important benefits that unfold over  time  and
can be observed only indirectly. We hope that future studies will acknowledge  the  complexity  of
motives that are behind an IPO, and try to measure the success of initial  public  offerings  using  a
broader and more comprehensive set of variables.
Finally, from a practical point of  view,  our  findings  suggest  that  the  benefits  of  IPOs  can  be
broader and richer than commonly thought. Unlike the automatic inflow of capital, however, some
of these benefits, like an improved visibility and  credibility,  need  to  be  actively  exploited  if  a
company wants to enjoy their effects. From  this  point  of  view,  an  increased  awareness  of  the
potential  associated  with  an  initial  public  offering  should  help  in  directing  the  attention   of
entrepreneurs on the range of possibilities that going public opens up.
APPENDIX 1: THE QUESTIONNAIRE SENT FOR THE SURVEY
|How important were these factors on the decision to go |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|public?                                                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|                                                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|Express your agreement on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 =    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|irrelevant and 7 = very important                      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|To broaden sources of finance                          |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To benefit from tax breaks                             |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To let shareholders sell part of their stocks          |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To benefit from a favorable trend of the Stock Exchange|1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To facilitate external growth                          |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To support the managerialization of the company        |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To favor change at the top                             |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To finance internal growth                             |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To support the establishment of strategic alliances    |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To increase the visibility of the company              |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To balance the debt/equity level                       |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|To improve the image and the prestige of the company   |1  |2  |3  |4  |5  |6  |7  |
|                                                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
References
|                                                                        |
|Aldrich, H., and C. Zimmer, 1986, Entrepreneurship through Social       |
|Networks, in D. L. Sexton and R. W. Smilor (eds.) The Art and Science of|
|Entrepreneurship, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, pp. 3-23                    |
|Barney, J. B. and M. H. Hansen, 1994, ‘Trustworthiness as a Source of   |
|Competitive Advantage’, Strategic Management Journal 15, 175-190.       |
|Beatty, R. and J. Ritter, 1986 ‘Investment Banking, Reputation and the  |
|Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings’, Journal of Financial         |
|Economics 15, 213-232.                                                  |
|Birley, S., 1985, ‘The Role of Networks in the Entrepreneurial Process’,|
|Journal of Business Venturing 1, 107-117.                               |
|Burt, R. S., 1992, Structural Holes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  |
|Press.                                                                  |
|Burt, R. S., 1993, ‘The Network Entrepreneur’, in Richard Swedberg (ed.)|
|Explorations in Economic Sociology, Russell Sage Foundation.            |
|Burt, R. S., 1997, ‘The Contingent Value of Social Capital’,            |
|Administrative Science Quarterly 42, 339-365.                           |
|Carter, R. and S. Manastar, 1990 ‘Initial Public Offerings and          |
|Underwriter Reputation’, Journal of Finance 45, 1045-1067.              |
|Cresswell, J. W., 1994, Research Design, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.       |
| De Visscher F.M., C.E Aronoff. and J.L. Ward, 1995, Financing          |
|Transitions: Managing Capital and Liquidity in the Family Business,     |
|Marietta GA, Business Owner Resources                                   |
|Deeds, D. L., D. Decarolis and J. E. Coombs, 1997, ‘The Impact of       |
|Firm-specific Capabilities on the Amount of Capital Raised in an Initial|
|Public Offering: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry’, Journal of  |
|Business Venturing 12, 31-46.                                           |
|DiMaggio, P., 1988, ‘Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory’, in L.|
|Zucker (ed.) Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and      |
|Environment, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.                                  |
|Doz, Y. and G. Hamel, 1998, Alliance Advantage: The Art of Creating     |
|Value through Partnering, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.    |
|Dubini, P. and H. Aldrich, 1991, ‘Personal and Extended Networks are    |
|Central to the Entrepreneurial Process’, Journal of Business Venturing  |
|6, 305-313.                                                             |
|Dyer, J. and H. Singh, 1998, ‘The Relational View: Cooperative          |
|Strategies and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage’,   |
|Academy of Management Review 23, 660-679.                               |
|Eisenhardt, K., 1989, ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’,     |
|Academy of Management Review 4, 532-550.                                |
|Fombrun, C. J., 1996, Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate    |
|Image, Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA.                    |
|Fombrun, C. J. and C. Van Riel, 1998, ‘The Reputational Landscape: A    |
|Convergence of Theory and Practice’, Corporate Reputation Review 1,     |
|5-13.                                                                   |
|Gale, I. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1989, ‘The Information Content of Initial  |
|Public Offerings’, Journal of Finance 44, 469-478.                      |
|Galunic, D. C. and S. Rodan, 1998 ‘Resource Recombinations in the firm: |
|Knowledge Structures and the Potential for Schumpeterian Innovation’,   |
|Strategic Management Journal 19, 1193-1201.                             |
|Glaser, B. and A. Strauss, 1967, The Discovery of Grounded Theory:      |
|Strategies of Qualitative Research, London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson.   |
|Harvey, M. and R. Evans, 1995 ‘Forgotten Sources of Capital for the     |
|Family-Owned Business’, Family Business Review 8, 159-175.              |
|Ibbotson, R., 1975, ‘Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues’,     |
|Journal of Financial Economics 2, 235-272.                              |
|Ibbotson, R. and J. Jaffe, 1975, ‘Hot Issue Market’, Journal of Finance |
|30, 1027-42.                                                            |
|Ibbotson, R., J. Sindelar, and J. Ritter, 1988, ‘Initial Public         |
|Offerings’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1, 37-45.              |
|Jarillo, C. and H. Stevenson, 1990, ‘A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship:    |
|Entrepreneurial Management’, Strategic Management Journal 11, 17-27.    |
|Jones, R.G., 1979, ‘Analyzing Initial and Growth Financial for Small    |
|Business’, Managing Accounting, 30-38.                                  |
|Keasey, K., P. McGuinness and H. Short, 1992, ‘New Issues of the U.K.   |
|Unlisted Securities Market: The Ability of Entrepreneurs to Signal Firm |
|Value’, Small Business Economics 4, 15-28                               |
|Krips Newman, P., 1985, ‘The Pros and Cons of Going Public’, SAM        |
|Advanced Management Journal, Winter.                                    |
|Larson, A., 1991, ‘Partner Networks: Leveraging External Ties to Improve|
|Entrepreneurial Performance’, Journal of Business Venturing 6, 173-188. |
|Larson, A. and J. A. Starr, 1993, ‘A Network Model of Organization      |
|Formation’ Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice Winter, 5-15.          |
|Lee, T. W., 1999, Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research, |
|Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.                                                |
|Leland, H. E. and D. H. Pyle, 1977, ‘Information Asymmetries, Financial |
|Structure and Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.|
|Leleux, B. F. and D. F. Muzyka, 1995, ‘IPO Long-Term Performance in the |
|United Kingdom. A Dynamic Beta Reappraisal’, in S. Birley and I.        |
|MacMillan (eds.) International Entrepreneurship, London: Routledge, pp. |
|147-173.                                                                |
|Lorenzoni, G., and A. Lipparini, 1999, ‘The Leveraging of Interfirm     |
|Relationships as a Distinctive Organizational Capability: A Longitudinal|
|Study’, Strategic Management Journal 20, 317-338.                       |
|Mahérault, L., 2000, ‘The Influence of Going Public on Investment       |
|Policy: an Empirical Study of French Family-Owned Business’, Family     |
|Business Review, 13, 71-79.                                             |
|Mello, A. and J. Parsons, 1998, ‘Going Public and the Ownership         |
|Structure of the Firm’, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 79-109.      |
|Nahapiet, J. and S. Ghoshal, 1998, “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital|
|and the Organizational Advantage”, Academy of Management Review 23,     |
|242-266.                                                                |
|Neau, D., 1994, ‘New Stock Issues and the Institutional Production of   |
|Trust’, Accounting, Organization and Society 16, 185-200.               |
|Pagano, M., F. Panetta and L. Zingales, 1998, ‘Why Do Companies Go      |
|Public? An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics 20,      |
|293-315.                                                                |
|Peterson, R., G. Kozmetsky, and N. Ridgway, 1983, ‘Perceived Causes of  |
|Small Business Failures: a Research Note’, American Journal of Small    |
|Business, 8: 15-19.                                                     |
|Pettigrew, A., 1990, ‘Longitudinal Field Research on Change’,           |
|Organization Science, 1, 267-292.                                       |
|Podolny, J. M. and D. J. Phillips, 1996, ‘The Dynamics of Organizational|
|Status’ Industrial and Corporate Change 5, 453-471.                     |
|Powell W. W., K. W. Koput and L. Smith-Doerr, 1996, “Interorganizational|
|Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in      |
|Biotechnology”, Administrative Science Quarterly 41, 116-145.           |
|Ritter, J. R., 1980, ‘The Hot Issue Market of 1980’, Journal of Business|
|57, 215-40.                                                             |
|Ritter, J. R., 1987, ‘The Costs of Going Public’, Journal of Financial  |
|Economics 19, 269-281.                                                  |
|Ritter, J. R., 1991, ‘The Long Run Performance of Initial Public        |
|Offerings’, Journal of Finance 46, 3-28.                                |
|Rock, K., 1986, ‘Why New Issues are Underpriced’, Journal of Financial  |
|Economics 15, 187-212                                                   |
|Salvato, C., 1999, ‘The Resource-Based Perspective in Entrepreneurship –|
|Explaining Growth”, in C. Salvato, P. Davidsson and A. Persson (eds.),  |
|Entrepreneurial Knowledge and Learning. Conceptual Advances and         |
|Direction for Future Research, JIBS Research Report, Jönköping,         |
|pp.12-37.                                                               |
|Schumpeter, J. A., 1934, The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, |
|MA: Harvard University Press.                                           |
|Shane, S. and S. Venkataraman, 2000, ‘The Promise of Entrepreneurship as|
|a Field of Research’, Academy of Management Review 25, 217-226.         |
|Steier, L. and R. Greenwood, 2000, ‘Entrepreneurship and the Evolution  |
|of Angel Financial Networks’, Organization Studies 21, 163-192.         |
|Stevenson, H. H. and D. E. Gumpert, 1985, ‘The Heart of                 |
|Entrepreneurship’, Harvard Business Review, 85.                         |
|Stuart, T. E., H. Hoang and R. C. Hybels, 1999, ‘Interorganizational    |
|Endorsements and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures’,          |
|Administrative Science Quarterly 44, 315-349.                           |
|Tinic, M., 1988, ‘Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock’, |
|Journal of Finance 43, 789-822                                          |
|Titman, S., and B. Trueman, 1995, ‘Information Quality and the Valuation|
|of New Issues’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 159-172          |
|Welbourne, T. M., and L. A. Cyr, 1999, ‘The Human Resource Executive    |
|Effect in Initial Public Offering Firms’, Academy of Management Journal |
|42, 616-629.                                                            |
|Zucker, L. G., 1986, ‘Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of     |
|Economic Structure, 1984-1920’, in B.M. Staw and L. Cummings (eds.),    |
|Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 8, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,  |
|pp. 53-112.                                                             |
TABLE I
The recent expansion of the Italian Stock Exchange (data in Mil. Euro)
|Year    |Listed      |Listed          |Capitalizati|% GNP   |Average    |
|        |companies   |companies       |on          |        |daily      |
|        |(Borsa)     |(Nuovo Mercato) |            |        |trading    |
|1991    |231         |-               |99,081      |13.3%   |66         |
|1992    |229         |-               |95,781      |12.2%   |71         |
|1993    |222         |-               |128,470     |15.9%   |212        |
|1994    |219         |-               |155,811     |18.2%   |392        |
|1995    |217         |-               |171,668     |18.6%   |292        |
|1996    |217         |-               |202,732     |20.6%   |322        |
|1997    |213         |-               |314,720     |30.7%   |697        |
|1998    |223         |-               |485,187     |45.2%   |1,680      |
|1999    |247         |-               |726,566     |65.6%   |1,998      |
|2000    |242         |6               |818,384     |70.2%   |3,422      |
|2001a   |241         |40              |663,820     |54.3%   |2,726      |
a
 July 31st 2001
Source: Borsa Italiana S.p.A. 
TABLE II
The case studies
|Company |Industry   |Year of|% of      |Data source                      |
|        |           |listing|shares    |                                 |
|        |           |       |offered   |                                 |
|Carcomp |Industrial |1995   |30%       |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |components |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |           |       |          |Direct interviews: managing      |
|        |           |       |          |director                         |
|Axial   |Industrial |1995   |35,7%     |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |components |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |           |       |          |Direct interviews: financial     |
|        |           |       |          |manager, managing director       |
|        |           |       |          |Press interviews: majority       |
|        |           |       |          |shareholder                      |
|Chainso |Mechanical |1995   |60%       |Archive (financial report,       |
|        |tools      |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |           |       |          |Direct interviews: CEO and       |
|        |           |       |          |majority shareholder             |
|Empire  |Television |1996   |24,2%     |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |broadcastin|       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |g          |       |          |Direct interviews: communication |
|        |           |       |          |manager, investor relator        |
|        |           |       |          |Press interviews: majority       |
|        |           |       |          |shareholder, chairman of the     |
|        |           |       |          |board                            |
|Felix   |Oil        |1997   |30%       |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |refinery   |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |and        |       |          |Direct interviews: financial     |
|        |distributio|       |          |manager                          |
|        |n          |       |          |Press interviews: majority       |
|        |           |       |          |shareholder, managing director   |
|Stock   |Clothing   |1997   |33%       |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |           |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |           |       |          |Direct interviews: managing      |
|        |           |       |          |director, majority shareholder   |
|Firegas |Industrial |1998   |40%       |Archive (financial reports,      |
|        |components |       |          |offering circular, etc.)         |
|        |           |       |          |Direct interviews: investor      |
|        |           |       |          |relator, managing director       |
|        |           |       |          |Press interviews: majority       |
|        |           |       |          |shareholder, managing director   |
Table III
Reasons for and benefits of going public: evidence from the preliminary cases
|Reasons for and benefits of going public                  |Number of    |
|                                                          |cases        |
|Finance development projects                              |5            |
|Rebalance debt/equity ratio                               |4            |
|Broaden potential sources of financing                    |3            |
|Renew and improve corporate image                         |3            |
|Improve relationships with the customers                  |2            |
|Enable and support strategic alliances                    |2            |
|Separate the company from the holding family              |2            |
|Legitimate the role of professional management            |1            |
Table VI
Reasons for going public: descriptive statistics (Likert scale 1-7)
|                                              |Mean       |Std.       |
|                                              |           |Deviation  |
|To finance internal growth                    |5.75       |1.50       |
|To facilitate external growth                 |5.59       |1.49       |
|To improve the image and the prestige of the  |5.46       |1.45       |
|company                                       |           |           |
|To increase the visibility of the company     |5.25       |1.54       |
|To broaden sources of finance                 |4.77       |1.80       |
|To support the establishment of strategic     |4.65       |1.71       |
|alliances                                     |           |           |
|To support the managerialization of the       |4.39       |1.58       |
|company                                       |           |           |
|To facilitate change at the top               |3.19       |2.18       |
|To let shareholders sell part of their stocks |3.12       |1.95       |
|To benefit from tax breaks                    |3.12       |1.51       |
|To balance the debt/equity level              |2.96       |1.90       |
|To benefit from a favorable trend of the Stock|2.79       |1.50       |
|Exchange                                      |           |           |
Table V
Rotated component matrix
|                                              |Components                         |
|                                              |1       |2       |3       |4       |
|To increase the visibility of the company     |0.87    |0.18    |0.14    |-0.06   |
|To improve the image and prestige of the      |0.83    |0.20    |0.00    |0.15    |
|company                                       |        |        |        |        |
|To support the establishment of strategic     |0.72    |0.17    |0.17    |0.04    |
|alliances                                     |        |        |        |        |
|To facilitate external growth                 |0.67    |-0.26   |0.05    |0.02    |
|To benefit from a favorable trend of the Stock|0.23    |0.71    |0,00    |-0.10   |
|Exchange                                      |        |        |        |        |
|To let shareholders sell part of their stocks |0.00    |0.66    |0.00    |0.17    |
|To benefit from tax breaks                    |0.11    |0.66    |0,26    |0.27    |
|To rebalance the debt/equity level            |-0.06   |0.06    |0.87    |0.14    |
|To broaden sources of finance                 |0.29    |0.00    |0.81    |-0.15   |
|To finance internal growth                    |0.39    |-0.56   |0.50    |0.01    |
|To facilitate change at the top               |-0.08   |0.23    |0.03    |0.87    |
|To support the managerialization of the       |0.54    |-0.01   |-0.05   |0.72    |
|company                                       |        |        |        |        |
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis - Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser  Normalization.  Rotation
converged in 5 iterations.
FIGURE 1
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